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Abstract
This paper examines welfare-maximizing monetary policy in an estimated micro-founded
general equilibrium model of the U.S. economy where the policymaker faces uncer-
tainty about model parameters. Uncertainty about parameters describing preferences
and technology implies uncertainty about the model’s dynamics, utility-based welfare
criterion, and the “natural” rates of output and interest that would prevail absent nom-
inal rigidities. We estimate the degree of uncertainty regarding natural rates due to
parameter uncertainty. We ﬁnd that optimal Taylor rules under parameter uncertainty
respond less to the output gap and more to price inﬂation than would be optimal absent
parameter uncertainty. We also show that policy rules that focus solely on stabilizing
wages and prices yield welfare outcomes very close to the ﬁrst-best.
JEL Code: E5
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This paper examines welfare-maximizing monetary policy in an estimated dynamic stochas-
tic general equilibrium (DSGE) model of the U.S. economy where the central bank faces
uncertainty about the values of model parameters. The design of optimal monetary policy
depends on the nature of the dynamics of the economy, the natural rates of output and
interest, and the central bank objective function. Traditional analysis of monetary policy
under uncertainty has treated these three factors as independent and studied them in isola-
tion (see, for example, Brainard 1967, and Rudebusch 2001). But, modern micro-founded
models imply that the structural parameters describing preferences and technology jointly
determine all three factors. Therefore, an analysis of monetary policy under parameter un-
certainty requires that these consequences of parameter uncertainty be analyzed in unison.
Recent papers by Giannoni (2002), Levin and Williams (2005), and Levin, Onatski,
Williams and Williams (2005; henceforth LOWW), have studied monetary policy under
parameter uncertainty in micro-founded models. The latter two papers imposed the linkage
between parameter uncertainty and uncertainty about the welfare costs of ﬂuctuations,
but neither examined the role of natural rate uncertainty in the design of optimal policy.
Aoki and Nikolov (2004) highlighted the connection between parameter uncertainty and
uncertainty about the natural rate of interest—deﬁned to be the real interest rate that
would prevail absent nominal rigidities—but did not explore further the role of natural
rates in the design of optimal policy under uncertainty.
We use a small estimated micro-founded model as a laboratory to explore how param-
eter uncertainty and the associated uncertainty about natural rates and welfare costs of
ﬂuctuations aﬀects the design of optimal monetary policy. We use the estimated covariance
of model parameters as a measure of parameter uncertainty. We analyze the implications of
parameter uncertainty on policy design and outcomes, from the perspective of a Bayesian
policymaker who aims to maximize expected household welfare. We ﬁrst show that parame-
ter uncertainty implies a non-trivial degree of uncertainty about the natural rates of output
and interest and that natural rate misperceptions on the part of the central bank are likely
to be persistent. We then show that optimal Taylor rules under parameter uncertainty
respond less to the output gap and more to price inﬂation than would be optimal absent
parameter uncertainty. This conclusion is consistent with that found in the literature on
optimal Taylor (1993) rules using traditional models, despite the very diﬀerent analytical
1frameworks (see Orphanides and Williams, 2002, and references therein). Finally, we show
that policy rules that respond solely to wage and price inﬂation perform better than the
optimized Taylor rule and yield welfare outcomes very close to the ﬁrst-best.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model that
we use for our analysis. Section 3 describes the model estimation and reports the results.
Section 4 examines optimal monetary policy assuming model parameters are known. Section
5 considers optimal policy under parameter uncertainty. Section 6 reexamines the design
of optimal policy using an alternative model of nominal rigidities. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
Our analysis uses a small micro-founded model with various frictions that interfere with
instantaneous full adjustment of quantities and prices to shocks. To make the analysis
tractable, we abstract from many features present in recently developed larger DSGE mod-
els, such as investment, ﬁscal policy, and international trade (see, for example, Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans, 2005, Smets and Wouters, 2003, and Lubik and Schorfheide, 2005).
We leave for future work the extension of our analysis to richer models.
We ﬁrst present the model’s preferences and technology and then describe the ﬁrms’
and households’ optimization problems. Mathematical descriptions of these problems are
given in Appendix A along with the model’s nonlinear and linearized ﬁrst order conditions
and steady-state solution. Throughout, we denote the log of variables by lower case letters.
2.1 The production technology










where Yf,t(x) denotes the quantity of the xth diﬀerentiated goods used in production and
Θp,t is the time-varying elasticity of substitution between the production inputs.
Final goods producers obtain their production inputs from the economy’s diﬀerentiated
intermediate goods producers who supply an output Ym,t(x). Not all of the diﬀerentiated
output produced by the intermediate goods producers is realized as ﬁnal goods’ inputs; some
output is absorbed in price formulation, following the adjustment cost model of Rotemberg
2(1982). We modify the Rotemberg model so that the cost of adjusting prices is relative to a
rule of thumb price adjustment equal to a weighted average of steady-state inﬂation and last
period’s inﬂation rate. In this way, we allow for intrinsic inertia in inﬂation. Speciﬁcally,
the relationship between Yf,t(j) and Ym,t(j) is given by






− (1 − γp)Πp,∗ − γpΠp,t−1
￿2
Ym,t, (2)
where the second term in (2) denotes the cost of setting prices, Pt(j) is the price charged by
ﬁrms j for a unit of its output, Πp,∗ is the steady-state price inﬂation rate, and Πp,t−1 is the
lagged price inﬂation rate. Our choice of quadratic adjustment costs for modeling nominal
rigidities contrasts with that of many other recent studies, which rely instead on staggered
contracts as in Calvo (1983). The ﬁrst-order dynamics of prices and wages are identical
to those derived from Calvo-based models. The second-order approximation to welfare,
however, diﬀers between the quadratic adjustment cost model and the Calvo-based model
and we examine the properties of optimal policies with a Calvo-based model in section 6.
The diﬀerentiated intermediate goods, Ym,t(j) for j ∈ [0,1], are produced by combining
each variety of the economy’s diﬀerentiated labor inputs that are supplied to market activ-
ities (that is, {Ly,t(z)} for z ∈ [0,1]). The composite bundle of labor, denoted Ly,t, that
obtains from this aggregation implies, given the current level of technology At, the output
of the diﬀerentiated goods, Ym,t. Speciﬁcally, production is given by,









where Θw,t is the time-varying elasticity of substitution between the diﬀerentiated labor
inputs. The log-level of technology, At, is modeled as a random walk:
lnAt = lnAt−1 + ǫA,t, (4)
where ǫA,t is an i.i.d. innovation. We abstract from trend growth in productivity.
2.2 Preferences
Households own shares in the ﬁrms in the economy. They derive utility from their purchases
of the consumption good Ct and from their use of leisure time, equal to what remains
of their time endowment ¯ L after 0 ≤ Lu,t(i) ≤ ¯ L hours of labor are allocated to non-
leisure activities. We assume the household members live forever and there is no population
3growth. Household preferences exhibit an additive habit (equal to a fraction η ∈ [0,1]
of its consumption last period) and are nonseparable between consumption and leisure.








(Ct(i) − ηCt−1(i))(¯ L − Lu,t(i))ζ
i1−σ
, (5)
where β is the household’s discount factor and Ξc,t a stochastic preference shifter that is
assumed to follow an AR(1) process in logs. The economy’s resource constraint implies that
R 1
0 Ct(x)dx ≤ Yf,t, where Yf,t denotes the output of the economy’s ﬁnal good.
Household i supplies Ly,t(i) hours to the labor market and devotes time to setting wages.
Consequently, time allocated to non-leisure activities, Lu,t(i), is given by






− (1 − γw)Πw,∗ − γwΠw,t−1
￿2
Lu,t, (6)
where the second term in (6) denotes the cost of setting wages in terms of labor time and
is analogous to the cost of setting prices, Wt(i) is the wage charged by household i for a
unit of its time, Πw,∗ is the steady-state wage inﬂation rate, and Πw,t−1 is the lagged wage
inﬂation rate.
2.3 Firms’ optimization problems
The ﬁnal goods producing ﬁrm takes as given the prices set by each intermediate-goods pro-
ducer for their diﬀerentiated output, {Pt(j)}1
j=0, and chooses intermediate inputs, {Yf,t(j)}1
j=0,
to minimize the cost of producing its ﬁnal output Yf,t, subject to its production technology,
given by equation (1).
Each intermediate-goods producing ﬁrm chooses the quantities of labor that it employs
in production and the price that it will set for its output. In deciding the quantities of
the various types of labor to employ, ﬁrm j takes as given the wage {Wt(i)}1
i=0 set by
each household for its variety of labor and chooses {Ly,t(i,j)}1
i=0 to minimize the cost of
attaining the aggregate labor bundle Ly,t(j) that it needs for production.
In setting its price, Pt(j), the intermediate-goods producing ﬁrm takes into account the
demand schedule for its output that it faces from the ﬁnal goods sectors and the fact—as
summarized in equation (2)—that its price aﬀects the amount of its output that it can
sell to ﬁnal goods producers. The intermediate-goods producing ﬁrm j takes as given the
4marginal cost MCt for producing Ym,t(j), the aggregate price level Pt, and aggregate ﬁnal-
goods demand Yf,t, and chooses its price Pt(j) to maximize the present discounted value
of its proﬁts subject to the cost of re-setting its price and the demand curve it faces for
its diﬀerentiated output. We assume a subsidy on production, equal to (Θp,∗ − 1)−1 that
oﬀsets the distortionary eﬀects of the presence of the markup of prices over costs due to the
presence of monopolistic competition.1
2.4 Households’ optimization problem
The household, taking as given the expected path of the gross nominal interest rate Rt,
the price level Pt, the aggregate wage rate Wt, its proﬁts income, and its initial stock of
bonds, chooses its consumption Ct(i) and its wage Wt(i) to maximize its utility subject to
its budget constraint, the cost of re-setting its wage, and the demand curve it faces for its
diﬀerentiated labor. In performing this problem we assume a subsidy on labor supply, equal
to (Θw,∗−1)−1, which, in combination with the production subsidy described above, ensures
that in the absence of nominal rigidities the model’s equilibrium outcome is Pareto optimal.
The model’s subsidies on labor supply and production are funded by lump sum taxes that
are imposed on households by the ﬁscal authority (which operates in the background of our
model) solely to ﬁnance these subsidies.
2.5 Steady-state and natural rate variables
The non-stochastic steady state is summarized by the steady-state levels of the real interest
rate and hours. The steady-state one-period real interest rate is given by R∗ = β−1 while





￿−1 ¯ L. Given the assumed non-
stationarity of the level of technology, in the following we work with normalized variables,
where we normalize the levels of consumption and output by the current level of technology.
The normalized steady-state levels of consumption and output therefore equal the steady-
state level of hours.
The model has a counterpart in which all nominal rigidities are absent, that is, prices
and wages are fully ﬂexible, that is, χp = χw = 0. We refer to the levels of output, hours,
1We acknowledge that such subsidies do not exist in practice, implying that in the real world the steady-
state level of output is ineﬃcient. We leave to future work the study of optimal policy under parameter
uncertainty in an economy characterized by a distorted steady-state allocation.
5and the real one-period interest rate in this equilibrium as the natural rates of output, e Yt,
hours, e Lt, and interest, e Rt, respectively. We also deﬁne log deviations of these variables
from their steady-state values, ˜ yt ≡ log e Yt − logY∗ and ˜ rt ≡ log e Rt − logR∗. These natural
rates are functions of our model’s structural shocks and are derived in Appendix A.
2.6 Monetary authority
We assume that the central bank uses the short-term interest rate as its instrument, For
estimation purposes, we assume that the short-term interest rate responds to deviations of
price inﬂation from its steady-state level, πp,t ≡ logΠp,t − logΠp,∗, and to the output gap,
xt = logYt − log e Yt. We also allow for policy inertia by including the lagged short-term
interest rate in the feedback equation. In particular, monetary policy is described by
rt = φrrt−1 + (1 − φr){φpπp,t + φxxt} + ǫr,t, (7)
where rt ≡ logRt − logR∗, yt ≡ logYt − logY∗, and ǫr,t is an i.i.d. policy shock. Note that
we have suppressed the constant that incorporates the steady-state levels of the interest and
inﬂation rate. In the analysis of optimal monetary policy, we specify a generalized version
of this policy rule, as described in section 4.
2.7 Equilibrium
Our model consists of the ﬁrst-order conditions (derived in Appendix A) describing ﬁrms’
optimal choice of prices and households’ optimal choices of consumption and wages, the
production technology (3), the policy rule (7), the market clearing conditions Yt(j) =
R 1
0 Cj,t(i)di ∀j and Lt(i) =
R 1
0 Li,t(j)dj ∀i, and the laws of motion for technology and the
preference shock.
3 Estimation
In order to analyze optimal Bayesian monetary policy under parameter uncertainty, we need
a posterior distribution of the model parameters. One approach to obtaining a posterior
distribution, consistent with the Bayesian approach to decision-making we assume for the
policymaker, is to estimate the model using Bayesian methods, as in LOWW and Justiniano
and Preston (this volume). This approach necessitates making speciﬁc assumptions regard-
ing the prior joint distribution of the model parameters. Because we want to avoid having
6the choice of the prior distribution overly inﬂuence our results, we instead follow a limited-
information approach to estimating the posterior distribution of the model parameters.2 In
particular, we estimate several of the structural parameters of our model using a minimum
distance estimation based on impulse responses to monetary policy and technology shocks.
Speciﬁcally, we estimate a VAR on quarterly U.S. data using empirical counterparts to
the theoretical variables in our model, and identify two of the model’s structural shocks
using identifying assumptions that are motivated by our theoretical model. We then choose
model parameters to match as closely as possible the impulse responses to these two shocks
implied by the model to those implied by an structural VAR.3 In this section we ﬁrst
describe the VAR and the identiﬁcation of the two shocks, and then discuss our parameter
estimates.
3.1 VAR speciﬁcation and identiﬁcation
The speciﬁcation of our VAR is determined by the model developed in the previous section
and our identiﬁcation strategy for the structural shocks. Concerning the latter, we follow
Gal´ ı (1999) and assume that the technology shock is the only shock that has a permanent
eﬀect on the level of output per hour. The monetary shock is identiﬁed by the restriction
that the last variable in the VAR (the funds rate) is Wold-causal for the preceding variables.
Our model and identifying assumptions combined suggest the inclusion of ﬁve variables in
the VAR: the ﬁrst diﬀerence of log output per hour, price inﬂation (the ﬁrst diﬀerence of
the log of the GDP deﬂator), the log labor share, the ﬁrst diﬀerence of log hours per person,
and the nominal funds rate. Output per hour, the labor share, and hours are the Bureau
of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) measures for the nonfarm business sector, where the labor share
is computed as output per hour times the deﬂator for nonfarm business output divided by
compensation per hour. Population is the civilian population age 16 and over. Letting Yt
denote the vector of variables in the VAR, we view the data in the VAR as corresponding,
2For various reasons, our approach may over- or under-estimate the degree of parameter uncertainty that
a policymaker faces. The extent to which our estimate of the spread of the posterior distribution is biased
should primarily aﬀect the quantitative aspect of out results, not the qualitative nature.
3Applications of this estimation strategy are found in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Amato and
Laubach (2003), and Christiano et al. (2005). This estimation methodology remains the subject of consid-
erable controversy; see e.g. Christiano et al. (2006) and Kehoe (2006).
7up to constants, to the model variables
Yt = [∆(yt − lt), πt, yt − lt − wt, ∆lt, rt]′ (8)
where lower case letters denote logs of the model variables. We estimate the VAR over the
sample 1966q2 to 2006q2, including four lags of each variable.
The structural form of the VAR is given by
A0Yt = constant + A(L)Yt−1 + εt, (9)
where Yt is deﬁned in (8). The short-run assumption implies that the last column of the
contemporaneous multiplier matrix A0 has all zeros above the main diagonal. The ﬁfth
element of εt is identiﬁed as the funds rate shock ǫr,t in (7). The long-run identifying
restriction of Gal´ ı (1999) is that permanent shocks to technology are the only shocks to
have a permanent eﬀect on labor productivity. Using this assumption, we identify the ﬁrst
element of εt as the technology shock ǫa,t in (4). This implies that the ﬁrst row of the matrix
of long-run (cumulative) eﬀects of εt on Yt, (I − A(1))−1A−1
0 , consists of zeros except for
the ﬁrst element. Appendix B provides further details.4
The dashed lines in Figure 1 show the impulse responses to a permanent one percent
increase in the level of technology. The dashed-dotted lines are one-standard deviation
bands around the impulse responses, computed by bootstrap methods.5 Figure 2 shows the
impulse responses to a one percentage point positive funds rate shock. The responses to a
funds rate shock are more precisely estimated than those for the technology shock.
4A potentially controversial aspect of our speciﬁcation is the inclusion of hours per capita in ﬁrst dif-
ferences. Recent years have witnessed a vigorous debate among macroeconomists whether hours worked
increase or decline following a technology shock. Francis and Ramey (2005) and Altig et al. (2002) have
attributed diﬀerences in results among diﬀerent studies to the issue whether hours per capita are included
in levels – in which case the level of hours is usually found to rise immediately following a technology shock
– or whether hours enter in ﬁrst diﬀerences or some other detrended form – in which case the level of hours
is often found to decline during the ﬁrst few quarters following the shock. We acknowledge that this is a
further important source of parameter uncertainty, but space constraints prevent us from addressing this
issue in our analysis.
5To prevent the standard error bands from diverging over time, we discard draws for which the implied
reduced-form VAR is unstable, such as draws for which the largest eigenvalue of the coeﬃcient matrix in
the reduced form, written in companion form, exceeds .99. In total, about 14 percent of draws are rejected.
83.2 Model parameter estimates
Before estimating the structural and monetary policy parameters of our model, we calibrate
several model parameters that play a small or no role in the model’s dynamics. We set the
discount factor, β = 0.9924, We normalize the time endowment to unity and set the steady-
state rates of price and wage inﬂation to zero. Because the parameters Θw and χw and Θp
and χp appear only as a ratio in the linearized version of the model (see Appendix A), they
are not separately identiﬁed. Following LOWW (2005), we set Θw and Θp to 6. Given these
values, we estimate the coeﬃcients on the driving process in the wage and price Phillips
equations, κw = Θw/(χwΠ2
w,∗) and κp = Θp/(χpΠ2
p,∗). From these estimates it is possible
to compute the implied values for χw and χp, but for convenience we focus on the values of
κw and κp.
The remaining parameters are estimated by minimizing the squared deviations of the
responses of the ﬁve variables [yt, πt, wt, lt, rt] implied by our model from their VAR
counterparts.6 To determine the horizon over which to match the IRFs, we apply the
information criterion of Hall et al. (2007), searching over a minimum horizon of quarters
0 through 4 and a maximum horizon of quarters 0 through 16. This criterion leads us to
match the IRFs of the ﬁve variables in quarters 0 through 13 following a technology shock
in quarter 0, and in quarters 1 through 13 following a funds rate shock (the response in the
impact quarter being constrained by the identifying assumption), for a total of 135 moments
to match. These moments are weighted inversely proportional to the standard error around
the VAR responses, as in Christiano et al. (2005). This places more weight on matching
the impulse responses to the monetary shock, which, as noted before, are estimated with
greater precision than the impulse responses to the technology shock.
When we estimate the model using the policy rule (7), we ﬁnd a slightly negative, but
near zero, response of monetary policy to the output gap, perhaps because the model’s
notion of the output gap bears little resemblance to measures used by policymakers. We
therefore restrict φx to zero. We impose the restriction that φp > 1, which is a necessary
6Speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst cumulate the VAR’s IRFs of ∆(yt − lt) and ∆lt to obtain the IRFs of yt − lt and
lt, and then add the latter to the former to obtain the IRF of yt. We also subtract the IRF of yt − lt − wt
from the IRF of yt − lt to obtain the IRF of wt. Since our VAR includes a constant in each equation, but
allows for permanent shocks to the levels of output, output per hour and the real wage, these levels follow a
unit root process with deterministic drift. The IRFs to a technology shock are therefore interpreted as the
permanent percent deviation from their growth path that would have obtained had the shock not occurred.
9Table 1: Parameter Estimates
Model Point Standard Correlation with
Parameter Estimate Error σ η ζ κw κp
σ 8.209 2.609 1.000 -0.995 0.996 0.716 0.008
η 0.364 0.070 1.000 -0.986 -0.700 -0.019
ζ 1.740 0.179 1.00 0.731 0.019
κw 0.006 0.000 1.000 -0.156
κp 0.010 0.000 1.000
φr 0.840 0.001
φp 1.000 0.019
condition for determinacy in our model.7 Furthermore, unrestricted estimation leads to
estimates of the indexation parameters γw and γp very close to or at the upper limit of 1.8
Because our method of examining parameter uncertainty described below becomes infeasible
when parameters are at boundaries, in the remainder we ﬁx both of these two parameters
at 1. In the end, we therefore estimated the seven parameters {σ,ζ,η,κw,κp,φr,φp}.
The estimated parameters and associated standard errors are shown in the ﬁrst two
columns of Table 1. The correlation coeﬃcients of the structural parameter estimates are
shown in the ﬁnal ﬁve columns of the table. The covariance matrix of the estimates is
computed using the Jacobian matrix from the numerical optimization routine and the em-
pirical estimate of the covariance matrix of the impulse responses from the bootstrap. The
estimates of the structural parameters are all statistically signiﬁcant. The parameters asso-
ciated with wage and price adjustment costs are estimated with a great deal of precision. In
contrast, the preference parameters, especially σ and ζ, are relatively imprecisely estimated
and the estimates are very highly correlated with each other, reﬂecting the diﬃculty the
data have in separating the inﬂuences of these parameters. We analyze this issue below.
The VAR responses of real wages and inﬂation diﬀer substantially depending on the
7An alternative speciﬁcation would be to impose the estimated policy rule implied by the VAR, as in
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). This reduces the number of parameters to be estimated, but can lead to
convergence problems if the VAR rule and some constellation of structural parameters leads to indeterminacy.
8Estimates of γw and γp are sensitive to the horizon of the IRFs that we match. Matching IRFs of
quarters 0 through 4 or 0 through 5, imply γw and γp estimates close to 0; for longer horizons γw and γp are
at or near 1. The information criterion strongly suggests matching IRFs of quarters 0 through 12 or longer.
10source of the shock: with rapid responses to technology shocks, and sluggish ones to funds
rate shocks. This is a feature that our price and wage speciﬁcation cannot deliver. Our
estimates of κw and κp imply that wages are very slow to adjust, while prices adjust more
quickly to fundamentals. These results are driven by the IRFs to the technology shock;
indeed, the IRFs to monetary policy shocks alone suggest very gradual price adjustment,
consistent with Christiano et al (2005). Despite the greater weight placed on matching the
more tightly estimated responses of inﬂation and real wage to the funds rate shock, our
model does better at matching the responses to a technology shock, as shown by the solid
lines in Figures 1 and 2. Our estimates of the parameters of the monetary policy rule,
φr and φπ, are broadly consistent with the ﬁndings of many other studies that estimate
monetary policy reaction functions, such as that of Clarida, Gal´ ı, and Gertler (2000).
One concern with the estimation of structural parameters in DSGE models in general,
and the method of IRF matching in particular, is parameter identiﬁcation (Canova and
Sala, 2006, Iskrev, 2007). In our case, we are particularly concerned about the separate
identiﬁcation of the preference parameters σ and ζ, and the adjustment cost parameters
κw and κp. We illustrate the potential for weak identiﬁcation of each of these two pairs
in Figure 3 by plotting the negative of the objective function while varying two of the
parameters within a range around their ﬁnal estimates, holding all other parameters ﬁxed
at their estimated values. The upper panel of Figure 3 shows that the objective function is
fairly ﬂat for values of σ above 8, regardless of the value of ζ. The lower panel of the ﬁgure
shows that, conditional on κp being at its estimated value of 0.01, κw is poorly identiﬁed
anywhere between 0.004 and 0.01. These ﬁgures thus underline the substantial degree of
ignorance about the true values of the parameters, which, if anything, our standard errors
based on the Jacobian seem to be understating.
4 Welfare and Optimal Monetary Policy
In this section we compute the optimal monetary policy responses to technology and pref-
erences shock assuming all model parameters are known. We assume that the central bank
objective is to maximize the unconditional expectation of the welfare of the representative
household. We further assume that the central bank has the ability to commit to future pol-
icy actions; that is, we examine optimal policy under commitment, as opposed to discretion.
11We consider only policies that yield a unique rational expectations equilibrium.
By focussing only on technology and preference shocks, we are admittedly examining
only a relatively small source of aggregate ﬂuctuations in output and wage and price inﬂation
and hence welfare losses in our model. Variance decomposition estimates indicate that these
two shocks account for only a small share of variations in hours at horizons beyond two
years and account for a small share of wage and price variability at all horizons. To conduct
welfare-based monetary policy analysis incorporating other sources of ﬂuctuations, we would
need to take a stand on the source of the other shocks to the economy. This would take us
aﬁeld of the primary purpose of the paper, and we therefore leave it to further research.
4.1 Approximating household welfare
We approximate household utility with a second-order Taylor expansion around the deter-
ministic steady state following the approach developed by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997)
and extended to models with nominal wage rigidities by Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000).
We denote steady-state values with an asterisk subscript. As shown in Appendix C, the
second-order approximation of the period utility function depends on the squared output
gap, xt, the squared quasi-diﬀerence of the output gap, the cross-product of the output
gap and its quasi-diﬀerence, and the squared ﬁrst-diﬀerence of the rates of price and wage
inﬂation. As shown in the appendix, in the linearized model, the natural rate of output,
yn
t , is a function of leads and lags of the technology and preference shocks.
After many steps, the second-order approximation to period utility can be written as
Ξc,t (Ct − ηCt−1)
1−σ ￿¯ L − Lu,t
￿ζ(1−σ)
1 − σ
= T.I.P. − L = T.I.P. − Lx − Lp − Lw
where T.I.P refers to terms that are independent of monetary policy and
Lx = (C∗ − ηC∗)




















(1 − η)2 · (xt − ηxt−1)
2
+ (1 − σ) ·
1 − βη
(1 − η)2xt (xt − ηxt−1)
￿
,
Lp = (C∗ − ηC∗)















Lw = (C∗ − ηC∗)















12In our welfare calculations, we ignore the T.I.P. terms and focus on the terms related to
the output gap and price and wage inﬂation rates.
The three elements in Lx correspond to the period welfare costs associated with output
deviating from its natural rate. Owing to habit formation, both the level of the output gap
and its quasi-diﬀerence aﬀect welfare. All three preference parameters enter the coeﬃcients
of the welfare loss for these terms. The terms in Lp and Lw correspond to the welfare loss
associated with adjustment costs in changing prices and wages. The coeﬃcients in these
terms depend primarily on the parameters associated with nominal rigidities. The welfare
costs of sticky prices and wages are inversely related to the price and wage sensitivity
parameters, κp and κw. The more ﬂexible are prices, the smaller are the welfare costs
implied by a given magnitude of inﬂation ﬂuctuations, and similarly for wages.
Based on the parameter point estimates, the weights on wage and price inﬂation gaps
are signiﬁcantly greater than those on the output gap terms, reﬂecting the high estimated
degree of stickiness in wage and price setting (i.e., low estimated values of κw and κp).
Table 2 reports the implied relative weights on the terms related to the output gap and
the ﬁrst-diﬀerences of wage and price inﬂation, where we have normalized the values of
the weights by the weight on the price inﬂation term at the point estimate. The ﬁrst row
reports the sum of the weights on the three terms in the loss associated with the output gap
and its quasi-diﬀerence.9 The ﬁrst column reports the weights computed at the parameter
point estimates. The second column reports the median values of the weights based on the
estimated distribution of the parameter values, approximated using 1000 draws from the
normal distribution with the estimated covariance for the parameter estimates, where we
truncate the parameter values at the lower ends of their distributions as follows: σ at 0.5, ζ
at 0.1, and η at 0. The median values of the weights are close to those implied by the point
estimates. At the point estimates, the variance in wage inﬂation gets a weight 1.7 times
that of price inﬂation, due to the estimated value of κw being about 60 percent as large
as that for κp. The weights on the variances of the output gap and the quasi-diﬀerence of
the output gap are somewhat smaller than that of inﬂation, but are somewhat higher than
typically seen in the literature due to our relatively high estimate of σ.
The variation in the weights of the loss function implied by parameter uncertainty is
9At the point estimates, the weights on the squared level of the output gap and on the squared quasi-
diﬀerence term are about equal, while that on the cross-product is smaller with the opposite sign.
13Table 2: Relative Weights in Central Bank Loss
Weight Point Median 70 Percent Mean
in Loss Estimate Estimate Interval Estimate
ωx 0.06 0.04 [0.0, 8.7] 8.28
ωp 1.00 0.92 [0.0, 159.1] 132.45
ωw 1.71 1.55 [0.0, 270.6] 211.31
enormous, reﬂecting the nonlinear relationship between the parameter values and the loss
weights. The third column reports the estimated 70 percent conﬁdence of the weights.
At the lower end of the 70 percent conﬁdence interval, the weights are very close to zero.
However, at the upper end, corresponding to high values of σ and ζ, the weights are about
150 times larger than those implied by the point estimates. The preference parameters have
a large eﬀect on steady-state utility, which aﬀects all loss-function weights and makes them
highly correlated. However, the ratio of the weights varies relatively little over the draws.
For example, the standard deviation of the ratio of the sum of the output gap weights to
the weight on price inﬂation gaps is 0.01 and the ratio of the weight on wage inﬂation gaps
to that on price inﬂation gaps is about 0.1. The mean values of the weights are dominated
by the upper end of the distribution of weights, which are between two and three times
larger than those based on the point estimates, reﬂecting the fact that the weights depend
in part on the inverse of some parameter values.
4.2 Optimal monetary policy with no parameter uncertainty
In our analysis of optimal monetary policies, it is important to be clear what information
the central bank has available in making its decision. We assume the central bank knows
the structure of the model. At the time of making its policy decision, the central bank is
assumed to observe all past observable data, but not the realization of the current shock.
In the case of no parameter uncertainty, the central bank is able to infer the past values of
the natural rates of interest, hours, and output from the observable data.
We ﬁrst compute the optimal certainty equivalent policy based on the point estimates
of the model parameters. The resulting policy and outcomes provide a useful benchmark
for the policy rules that we examine. The optimal certainty equivalent policy maximizes
14the quadratic approximation of welfare, subject to the constraints implied by the linearized
model. Throughout, in computing the welfare loss we assume a discount rate arbitrarily
close to zero, so that we are maximizing the unconditional measure of welfare. We compute
the fully optimal policy using Lagrangian methods as described in Finan and Tetlow (1999),
adapted to take account of assumption of date t − 1 information in the implementation of
monetary policy. The standard deviations of the technology and preference shocks (the
only stochastic elements in the model) are set to their corresponding estimated values of
0.64 and 6.17 percentage points, respectively. (See Appendix B for the calculation of these
values.)
The results under the optimal policy are shown in the ﬁrst column of Table 3. The
middle portion of the table shows the resulting welfare losses. The ﬁrst row of this part
of the table reports the overall welfare loss, L. Because the units of the welfare loss are
diﬃcult to interpret, the next four rows of the table report the welfare losses (and its
component parts) measured in terms “consumption-equivalent” units, denoted by C, equal
to the percentage point reduction in steady-state consumption (absent ﬂuctuations) that
would yield the same welfare loss as implied by ﬂuctuations in the output gap and wage and
price inﬂation rates around their steady state values. The lower part of the table reports
the resulting unconditional standard deviations of the output gap, the ﬁrst-diﬀerences of
the price and wage inﬂation rates, and the level of the nominal interest rate.
The “consumption equivalent” welfare loss is extremely small under the optimal mon-
etary policy with no uncertainty, about 1/200th of one percent of consumption. This tiny
loss reﬂects the fact that the preference and technology shocks do not create signiﬁcant
tradeoﬀs between the objectives in the loss. Indeed, were it not for the assumption that
policy acts using lagged information, the preference shock would generate no welfare loss
under optimal policy through its contribution to ﬂuctuations in the output gap and wage
and price inﬂation while the technology shock would engender only very small welfare losses
(reﬂecting the tradeoﬀ implied by the presence of sticky wages). The technology shock does
entail a tradeoﬀ owing to the presence of sticky wages, but under the optimal policy, the
resulting loss is very modest. Under the fully optimal monetary policy, variability in the
output gap and the ﬁrst diﬀerences in the rates of wage and price inﬂation are all reduced to
nearly zero. In terms of the annualized rate, the standard deviations of both wage and price
inﬂation are about 0.1 percentage point. The optimal policy induces considerable interest
15Table 3: Performance of Alternative Monetary Policies
No Uncertainty Parameter Uncertainty
Optimal Policy Rule Optimal Policy Rule
Policy Coeﬃcients Policy Coeﬃcients
rn .84 1.00
x 27.88 .12 7.02 1.46
πp .01 566.78 391.40 15.39 617.80 480.86
πw 1000.00 693.78 1000.00 780.89
Welfare Losses
L 717.8 771.1 742.5 719.2 1.98E7 5.20e7 2.20E7 1.99E7
C .006 .007 .007 .006 .007 .010 .007 .007
Cx .001 .002 .001 .001 .001 .004 .002 .002
Cp .003 .003 .003 .003 .003 .003 .003 .003
Cw .002 .002 .002 .002 .002 .002 .002 .002
Standard Deviations
x .08 .10 .09 .08 .09 .16 .11 .10
∆πp .03 .03 .03 .03 .03 .03 .03 .03
∆πw .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02
r 2.59 2.69 2.38 2.59 2.59 2.22 2.51 2.94
rate variability in response to these two shocks, with the standard deviation of the nominal
(annualized) interest rate of over 10 percentage points. This variability implies that the
zero lower bound on nominal interest rate is a relevant concern, but we leave incorporating
this constraint to future research.
4.3 Alternative monetary policy rules
In the presence of parameter uncertainty, it is useful to analyze monetary policy in terms
of a policy rule in which the policy instrument depends on a small number of variables. For
this purpose, we consider three parsimonious monetary policy rules, each of which yields a
welfare loss that is very close to the fully optimal policy when all parameters are known.
The general speciﬁcation is a Taylor-type policy rule where the nominal interest rate is
determined by the lagged values of the central bank estimate of the natural rate of interest,
16ˆ rn
t , the central bank estimate of the output gap, ˆ xt, and the rates of price and wage inﬂation:
rt = πp,t−1 + φrnˆ rn
t−1 + φx ˆ xt−1 + φp πp,t−1 + φw πw,t−1. (10)
With known parameters, the central bank estimates of the natural rates are assumed to
equal their respective true values; with parameter uncertainty, these estimates suﬀer from
measurement error, as discussed in the next section. Note that we have assumed that
policy responds to the lagged values of these variables, in keeping with our assumption that
policy is set using t−1 information.10 Throughout the following, we restrict the policy rule
coeﬃcient on price inﬂation to be no smaller than 0.01 and we do not allow any coeﬃcients
to exceed 1000.11
We consider three types of policy rules. The ﬁrst is a version of the standard Taylor Rule,
where the interest rate is determined by inﬂation and the output gap. The second is a rules
that responds only to wage and price inﬂation. The third is a generalization of the other
rules that is exactly as speciﬁed in equation (10). This rule is used as a close approximation
for the fully optimal rule, but has the advantage that the coeﬃcients are easier to interpret.
We compute the optimal coeﬃcients of each rule to maximize unconditional welfare of
the representative household using a numerical hill-climber routine, as described in Levin,
Wieland, and Williams (1999). Absent parameter uncertainty, the optimized versions of all
three rules yield welfare losses close to that which obtains under the fully optimal policy.
The optimized Taylor rule (the second column of Table 3) acts like a strict output
targeting policy that aims to keep the output gap near zero at all times. This rule has
the minimum allowable coeﬃcient on price inﬂation and a very large coeﬃcient on the
output gap. The policy rule that responds to wage and price inﬂation (the third column of
Table 3) behaves like a targeting rule that aims to maintain a negative correlation between
the rates of price and wage inﬂation, with the latter more tightly controlled. The optimized
coeﬃcients exhibit massive responses to wage and price inﬂation, with the coeﬃcient on
wage inﬂation about 1.76 times as large as that for price inﬂation. This is nearly identical
to the ratio of 1.71 of the weights in the objective function of wage to price inﬂation.
The optimized generalized policy rule (the fourth column of Table 3) is characterized by a
signiﬁcant response to the natural rate of interest, a modest response to the output gap,
10Another approach would be to specify the rule in terms of t−1 expectations of current-period variables.
11In the case where this upper bound is a binding constraint, the loss surface is nearly ﬂat in the vicinity
of the reported parameter values and increasing the upper bound has only a trivial eﬀect on welfare.
17and very large responses to the rates of price and wage inﬂation. This rule behaves much
like the rule that targets a combination of wage and price inﬂation; the ratio of coeﬃcients
on wage and price inﬂation are nearly the same in the two cases. This generalized rule
yields a welfare loss that is nearly identical to that under the fully optimal policy.
5 Monetary Policy under Parameter Uncertainty
In this section, we analyze the performance and robustness of monetary policies under
parameter uncertainty where the central bank maximizes expected welfare. The only form
of uncertainty that the policymaker is assumed to face is uncertainty regarding model
parameters owing to sample variation. In particular, we assume that the central bank
knows the true model and that the model is estimated using a consistent estimator and that
the central bank is certain that the model and the estimation methodology are correct.12
We abstract from learning and assume that the policymaker’s knowledge and uncertainty
do not change over time. We assume that private agents know everything, including the
central bank’s parameter estimates. For a given speciﬁcation of monetary policy, expected
welfare is approximated by numerically integrating the welfare outcomes over a sample
drawn from the distribution of the ﬁve estimated structural parameters implied by the
estimated covariance matrix.
5.1 Natural rate uncertainty
Before proceeding with the analysis of monetary policy rules, we ﬁrst provide some sum-
mary measures of the degree of uncertainty regarding the natural rates of hours, output,
and interest owing to parameter uncertainty. In this model, the responses of the natural
rates to technology and preference shocks depend on three parameters describing household
preferences: σ, η, and ζ. Throughout the remainder of the paper, we assume that the dis-
tribution of model parameters is jointly normal distributed with mean zero and covariance
12The assumption that the policymaker is certain about the correctness of the estimation methodology
likely reduces the degree of parameter uncertainty relative to what policymakers face in reality. For example,
in the model used in this paper, some parameter point estimates can vary signiﬁcantly, depending on sample
and speciﬁcs of the estimation method. We leave the study of this broader form of estimation uncertainty
to future work.
18given by the estimated covariance matrix. We approximate this distribution with a single
set of 1000 draws from the estimated covariance matrix, truncated as described in section 3.
In general, parameter uncertainty implies uncertainty both about the steady-state val-
ues of natural rates as well as their movements over time. However, in the stylized model
that we study here, the steady-state natural rate of interest depends only on the household’s
discount rate, which is assumed to be known by the policymaker. Therefore, uncertainty
about the natural rate of interest is limited to its deviations from steady-state. The steady-
state level of hours (and thereby output) depends on estimated structural parameters and
the value of the time endowment. Our estimation methodology does not use information
on levels of variables, so we do not have an empirical measure of uncertainty regarding
the steady-state level of hours. For simplicity, we assume that the policymaker, by ob-
serving a long time series on hours, is able to estimate the mean level of hours precisely.
We assume that the policymaker has no independent knowledge of the time endowment, so
perfect knowledge of the mean level of hours has no implications for uncertainty about other
preference parameters. We note that under less restrictive assumptions, there exist tight
links between estimated structural parameters and steady-state values, which aﬀect both
model estimation and the analysis of parameter uncertainty. Indeed, Laubach and Williams
(2003) ﬁnd evidence of considerable uncertainty regarding low-frequency components of nat-
ural rates of interest and output, suggesting that the assumption that the steady-state levels
are known with certainty is untenable in practice. We leave consideration of uncertainty
about steady-state values in a micro-founded model to future research.
The responses of natural rates to technology and preference shocks depend on the pa-
rameter values describing preferences. The thick solid line in the upper panel of Figure 4
plots the impulse response of the log of the natural rate of hours to one standard deviation
positive innovations to technology and preferences, implied by the point estimates of the
model parameters. (Note that the log of the natural rate of hours equals the log of the nat-
ural rate of output minus the log of TFP.) The thin solid lines show the median responses
of the natural rate of hours, calculated from impulse responses from 1000 draws from the
estimated parameter distribution. The dashed and dashed-dotted lines show the bound-
aries of the 70 and 95 percent conﬁdence bands of the impulse responses, respectively. The
lower panel of the ﬁgure shows the corresponding outcomes for the natural rate of interest
(measured at an annualized rate). Note that the model implies that there is no uncertainty
19about the long-run eﬀects of technology or preference shocks on the natural rates of hours
and interest, as both of which eventually return to their respective steady-state values.
We assume that the central bank computes its estimates of natural rates based on the
point estimates of the preference parameters.13 We measure natural rate misperceptions as
the diﬀerence between the level of the natural rate implied by the actual parameter values
and the level implied by the point estimates of the model parameters. Averaging over the
1000 draws from the parameter distribution, the root mean squared deviation of the true
natural rate of output and the central bank’s estimate (computed using the parameter point
estimates) is a rather modest 0.13 percentage point. The mean ﬁrst-order autocorrelation of
this diﬀerence is 0.84. The root mean squared deviation of the true natural rate of interest
from the central bank’s estimate is a more sizable 1.05 percentage points (measured at an
annual rate), with a mean ﬁrst-order autocorrelation of 0.35.
5.2 Optimal monetary policy under parameter uncertainty
In order to provide a benchmark for policies under uncertainty, we ﬁrst compute the optimal
outcome if the policymaker knew all the parameter values and followed the fully optimal
policy in each case. The results in the ﬁfth column of Table 3. Of course, given that
the parameters are uncertain, this outcome is not obtainable in practice, but this exercise
provides a benchmark against which we can measure the welfare costs associated with
parameter uncertainty. As can be seen from comparing the ﬁrst and ﬁfth columns of the
table, the mean welfare loss under the ﬁrst-best optimal policy is considerably larger than
that computed at the parameter point estimates. This reﬂects the fact that the mean
weights in the welfare loss are higher than the weights evaluated at the point estimates.
That said, the consumption-equivalent welfare losses and the the variability of key variables
is about the same on average as under the optimal policy evaluated at the parameter point
estimates.
We now examine the characteristics and performance of the implementable monetary
policy rules introduced in the previous section. We ﬁrst consider the performance of the
rules that were found to be optimal absent parameter uncertainty, then we reoptimize the
coeﬃcients of these policy rules to minimize the expected welfare loss under parameter
13The central bank could use other methods to estimate the natural rates that take into account parameter
uncertainty, but our approach seems a reasonable benchmark for our analysis.
20uncertainty. As noted above, in implementing these rules, we assume the central bank
computes its estimates of natural rates using the point estimates of the parameters. For
each draw from the parameter distribution, the realizations of the natural rates (and all
other variables) are generated by the model based on the parameter values drawn.
The optimized Taylor rule assuming no parameter uncertainty does not yield a unique
stable rational expectations equilibrium for 17 of the 1000 draws of parameter values drawn
from the posterior distribution. The source of the problem is that the response to the output
gap is excessively large and this creates instability in the system. The other two policies
yield a unique solution for all 1000 draws and deliver mean outcomes that are close to what
obtains if the coeﬃcients of the rules are reoptimized under parameter uncertainty.
Relative to the case of no parameter uncertainty, the optimized standard Taylor rule
under parameter uncertainty responds far less aggressively to the estimate of the output
gap (a coeﬃcient of 7 compared to nearly 28) and more strongly to inﬂation (a coeﬃcient
of over 15 compared to .01). This rule yields a unique solution in all 1000 draws from
the parameter distribution. The results for this rule are shown in the sixth column of the
table. This dramatic change in the characteristics of the optimal Taylor rule is due to the
mismeasurement of the natural rate of output under parameter uncertainty. In fact, if the
central bank faced parameter uncertainty but somehow knew the true values of the natural
rate of output, the optimized Taylor rule would be characterized by a very small response to
inﬂation and a very large response to the output gap. However, in the presence of natural
rate uncertainty, a very large response to the output gap generates correspondingly large
policy errors. In order to minimize this source of undesired ﬂuctuations and to oﬀset the
eﬀects of the resulting policy errors on inﬂation, the optimized Taylor rule under parameter
uncertainty responds much more modestly to the perceived output gap and much more
strongly to inﬂation.
Optimized policy rules that respond to wage and price inﬂation, but not output, are very
eﬀective at minimizing the mean welfare loss under parameter uncertainty. The results for
this rule are shown in the seventh column of the table. The optimized rule yields a welfare
loss close to the ﬁrst-best allocation, and performs better than the optimized Taylor rule.
The coeﬃcients display the same characteristics as in the case of no parameter uncertainty:
the coeﬃcient on wage inﬂation is at its maximum value of 1000, and the ratio of the wage
inﬂation coeﬃcient to the price inﬂation coeﬃcient is about 1.6, slightly smaller than in the
21case of no uncertainty. Evidently, responding to aggressively to the wage and price inﬂation
rates substitutes for responding to the output gap in this model.
Finally, the generalized rule yields expected welfare nearly the same as the theoretical
ﬁrst-best. Thus, from a Bayesian perspective, knowledge of the exact draw of parameter
values has little beneﬁt in terms of expected welfare. This rule responds fully to the natural
rate of interest (we imposed an upper bound on this coeﬃcient of one), moderately to the
output gap, and massively to the rates of wage and price inﬂation. The results are reported
in the ﬁnal column of the table. Although the response to the output gap is larger than in
the case of no parameter uncertainty, the behavior of policy is dominated by the responses
to wage and price inﬂation that are two orders of magnitude larger than the response to the
output gap. Interestingly, this rule responds more aggressively to the observable variables
than its counterpart derived assuming no parameter uncertainty. Thus, in this micro-
founded DSGE model, parameter uncertainty leads to a more aggressive monetary policy
rule, rather than a less responsive one, as in Brainard’s (1967) analysis using a traditional
model.
6 Calvo Wage and Price Contracts
We now examine the characteristics of optimal monetary policies assuming Calvo-style con-
tracts that are commonly assumed in the literature, rather than quadratic adjustment costs.
Under suitable assumptions, the Calvo contract model yields the same log-linear ﬁrst-order
dynamics, but a diﬀerent second-order approximation to welfare. Unlike the quadratic
adjustment cost model, the assumption of Calvo contracts implies heterogeneity across
agents in wages and prices. Most signiﬁcantly, this implies diﬀerences in labor supply and
consumption across households, which, given our assumption of nonseparable preferences
over consumption and leisure, greatly complicates aggregation of the model. Additional
assumptions, however, such as those made by Smets and Wouters (2003), makes aggrega-
tion of ﬁrst-order dynamics and welfare more tractable. Speciﬁcally, we assume that each
household contains a continuum of members that replicate the distribution of types of labor
in the economy and each household shares its resources across its members optimally. In
this way, we are able to derive tractable analytical expressions for the ﬁrst-order aggregate
dynamics and the second-order approximation to welfare.
22Table 4: Performance of Monetary Policies: Calvo Contracts
No Uncertainty Parameter Uncertainty
Optimal Policy Rule Optimal Policy Rule
Policy Coeﬃcients Policy Coeﬃcients
rn .78 1.00
x 26.84 8.68 16.16 5.57
πp .01 138.25 15.64 .05 178.58 23.14
πw 1000.00 324.46 1000.00 256.18
Welfare Losses
C .034 .102 .036 .034 .035 .105 .037 .035
Cx .019 .002 .021 .019 .020 .004 .018 .018
Cp .005 .003 .005 .005 .005 .003 .005 .005
Cw .010 .097 .010 .010 .010 .098 .014 .013
Standard Deviations
x .43 .10 .45 .44 .44 .15 .34 .34
∆πp .04 .03 .04 .04 .04 .03 .04 .04
∆πw .01 .02 .01 .01 .01 .02 .01 .01
r 2.53 2.62 2.36 2.53 2.63 2.27 2.48 2.61
The relationship between the coeﬃcient on the driving process in the equation describing
the ﬁrst-order of product prices, κp, and the coeﬃcient on the variability of price inﬂation
in the second-order approximation to household welfare is identical for the quadratic ad-
justment costs model and the Calvo contract model. For wages, however, the relationship











multiplies the coeﬃcient on wage inﬂation variability
in the loss function. Given the estimated and calibrated parameter values, this additional
term is relatively large and implies notably greater weight on wage inﬂation than in the
model with quadratic adjustment costs.
Qualitatively, the results regarding the eﬀects of uncertainty on optimal policy are the
same with Calvo contracts as with quadratic adjustment costs. Table 4 reports the results of
our policy experiments using Calvo wage and price contracts. In the case of the Taylor rule,
the optimal coeﬃcient on the output gap is smaller and the coeﬃcient on price inﬂation is
larger with parameter uncertainty than absent parameter uncertainty, just as with quadratic
23adjustment costs. And, as before, the rule that responds solely to wage and price inﬂation
come very close to matching the ﬁrst-best outcome, while the standard Taylor rule performs
less well. The relative response to wage inﬂation compared to price inﬂation is signiﬁcantly
greater than before, owing to the greater welfare costs to ﬂuctuations in wages under Calvo
contracts.
7 Conclusion
This paper has examined the implications of parameter uncertainty for the design of optimal
monetary policy in an estimated micro-founded macroeconomic model. In micro-founded
models of this type, parameter uncertainty implies joint uncertainty about model dynamics,
natural rates, and the welfare costs of ﬂuctuations. We ﬁnd that optimal Taylor rules
respond less to output and more to inﬂation in the presence of parameter uncertainty. We
also show that policy rules that focus solely on stabilizing wages and prices, rather than
output, perform better than Taylor rules. Our analysis can be extended to model that
include additional features of the economic landscape and associated uncertainty, including
a richer description of the economy, a wider set of sources of aggregate ﬂuctuations, and
uncertainty regarding the structure of the economy. One potentially important direction for
future research is the incorporation of imperfect information on the part of private agents
as well.
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27Figure 1: VAR and Model Responses to a Technology Shock
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Notes: The dashed lines show the impulse responses implied by the VAR following an
identiﬁed technology shock that raises output per hour permanently by 1 percent. The solid
lines show the impulse responses implied by the model to a permanent shock to technology
that has the same long-run eﬀect on productivity as the technology shock in the VAR. The
dashed-dotted lines are one standard error conﬁdence intervals around the VAR responses.
28Figure 2: VAR and Model Responses to a Funds Rate Shock
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Notes: The dashed lines show the impulse responses implied by the VAR following a one
percent funds rate shock. The solid lines show the impulse responses implied by the model
to the same shock under the assumption that the contemporaneous response of all variables
other than the funds rate is zero. The dashed-dotted lines are one standard error conﬁdence
intervals around the VAR responses.










































Notes: The upper panel of the ﬁgure shows the negative of the minimand in the parameter
estimation as a function of combinations of σ and ζ, keeping all other parameters at their
estimated values. The lower panel shows the negative of the minimand in the parameter
estimation as a function of combinations of κw and κp, keeping all other parameters at their
estimated values.
30Figure 4: Natural Rate Uncertainty


















































































Notes: The thick solid lines show the model impulse responses of the natural rates to a one
standard deviation point positive innovations to technology (left column) or preferences
(right column), based on the parameter point estimates. The thin solid lines show the
corresponding median responses computed from the distribution of the parameter estimates.
The dashed and dashed-dotted lines indicate the corresponding 70 percent and 95 percent
conﬁdence intervals, respectively.
31A The Linearized Model
The ﬁrst sub-section of this appendix gives the mathematical descriptions of the ﬁrms’
and households’ optimization problems, the second subsection reports the model’s non-
linear equations, and the third sub-section reports the model’s log-linear equations. We
limit ourselves throughout in reporting just the equations from the symmetric model. The
fourth sub-section reports the model’s natural rates of output and interest.
A.1 The ﬁrms’ and households’ optimization problems
The ﬁnal goods producing ﬁrm in each sector, taking as given the prices set by each
















This problem implies a demand function for each of the economy’s intermediate goods given
by Yf,t(j) = (Pt(j)/Pt)
−Θp,t Yf,t, where the variable Pt is the aggregate price level, deﬁned





In the cost-minimization part of its problem, each intermediate-goods producing ﬁrm j,
taking as given the wages {Wt(i)}1















This cost-minimization problem implies that the economy-wide demand for type i labor
is Ly,t(i) =
R 1
0 Ly,t(i,x)dx = (Wt(i)/Wt)
−Θw,t (1/At)
R 1
0 Ym,t(x)dx where Wt denotes the




1−Θw,t . The marginal cost function
of producing the intermediate goods is MCt(j) = Wt/At.
In the proﬁt-maximization part of the its problem, each intermediate-goods producing
ﬁrm, taking as given the marginal cost MCt(j) for producing Ym,t(j), the aggregate price


























32In (13) the discount factor that is relevant for discounting nominal revenues and costs
between periods t and t+j is Etβj Λc,t+j/Pt+j
Λc,t/Pt , where Λc,t is the household’s marginal utility
of consumption in period t. The parameter ςθ,p is the subsidy that we assume equals
(Θp,∗−1)−1), which ensures that in the absence of nominal rigidities the model’s equilibrium
outcome is Pareto optimal.
The household taking as given the expected path of the gross nominal interest rate Rt,







































The parameter ςθ,w in the household’s budget constraint is a subsidy (equal to (Θw,∗−1)−1),
which ensures that in the absence of nominal rigidities the model’s equilibrium outcome
is Pareto optimal. The variable Bt(i) in the budget constraint is the state-contingent
value, in terms of the numeraire, of household i’s asset holdings at the beginning of pe-
riod t. We assume that there exists a risk-free one-period bond, which pays one unit of
the numeraire in each state, and denote its yield—that is, the gross nominal interest rate






. Proﬁts in the budget con-
straint are those rebated from ﬁrms, which are ultimately owned by households. Taxes
in the budget constraint are lumpsum and are raised by the ﬁscal authority (which oper-
ates in the background of our model) solely to ﬁnance the subsidies on labor supply and
production, which ensure the Pareto optimality of the steady-state outcome; speciﬁcally,
R 1
0 Taxest(i)di = ςθ,w
R 1




The ﬁrst-order conditions from the intermediate goods producing ﬁrms’ cost-minimization














The ﬁrst-order condition from the intermediate goods producing ﬁrms proﬁt-maximization


















The ﬁrst-order conditions from the household’s utility-maximization problem (equation 14),












· Ly,t = (Θw,t−1)(1+ςθ,w)
Wt
Pt























Λl,t = ζΞc,t (Ct−ηCt−1)
(1−σ) ￿¯ L−Lt
￿ζ(1−σ)−1 . (21)
The model has three market clearing conditions: the labor market clearing condition, the
intermediate-goods market clearing condition, and the ﬁnal-goods market clearing condi-
tion. In the symmetric equilibrium these are given by:
Lu,t = Ly,t +
χw
2
(Πw,t − (1 − γw)Πw,∗ − γwΠw,t−1)
2 Lu,t, (22)
Yf,t = Ym,t −
χp
2
(Πp,t − (1 − γp)Πp,∗ − γpΠp,t−1)
2 Ym,t, (23)
Ct = Yf,t (24)
34A.3 Log-linearized ﬁrst-order conditions
The ﬁrst-order conditions implied by the intermediate goods producing ﬁrm’s cost mini-
mization problem, given by equations (15) and (16), log-linearize to
ly,t = ym,t − at (25)
mct = wt − at (26)
The ﬁrst-order conditions implied by the intermediate goods producing ﬁrm’s proﬁt maxi-






































The ﬁrst-order conditions implied by the household’s utility maximization problem, given
by equations (18) and (19), log-linearize to



































































(ct − ηct−1) + ξc,t + (1 − ζ (1 − σ))
Lu,∗
¯ L − Lu,∗
· lu,t. (31)
The price markup shock θp,t in (27), the wage markup shock θw,t in (29), and the preference
shock ξc,t in (30) and (31) are as usual deﬁned as the logs of their uppercase counterparts.
35The market clearing conditions, equations (22), (23), and (24), log-linearize to:
lu,t = ly,t = lt (32)
yf,t = ym,t = yt (33)
ct = yf,t (34)
Three more equations remain in our model: (i) the process for the shocks At, deﬁned in
equation (4), which log-linearizes to
at = at−1 + ǫt, (35)
(ii) the monetary policy process, which was already given in log-linearized form in equa-
















wt − wt−1 = πw,t − πp,t
Before concluding this section we note the following about the steady-state solution to















¯ L − Lu,∗
Since L∗ = Lu,∗ = Ly,∗ we can re-write this as:
ζL∗































(ct − ηct−1) + ξc,t +

































(yt − ηyt−1) + ξc,t +





(yt − at). (38)
Equations (37) and (38) will be used in deriving the natural rate.
36A.4 Natural rates in the log-linear model
The natural rate of output, i.e. the level of output in the equilibrium with perfectly ﬂexible
prices and wages, is determined by the condition that the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure be (up to constants) equal to the marginal product of
labor at all dates t. In log terms, ˜ yt is determined implicitly by the equation
mrst = mplt (39)
where mrst = λl,t − λc,t and, from the production function (3), mplt = at. Substituting
from (37) and (38) for λc,t and λl,t yields the following expression for ˜ yt:
[δ1 − δ2(L + βL−1)]˜ yt = [δ3 − δ4L−1]at + δ5[1 − L−1]ξc,t (40)


















(1 − βη)(1 − η)
￿
δ3 = 1 +










, and δ5 =
βη
1 − βη
The natural rate of interest, denoted ˜ rt, is the real rate rt − Etπt+1 prevailing in the
equilibrium with perfectly ﬂexible prices and wages. Letting ˜ λc,t denote the expression (37)
with ˜ yt substituted for yt, the Euler equation (28) in this equilibrium can be expressed as
˜ rt = ˜ λc,t − Et˜ λc,t+1 (41)
But, in this equilibrium, ˜ λc,t = ˜ λl,t − at. Substituting for ˜ λc,t we obtain
˜ rt = [δ6 + δ7 − δ6L − δ7L−1]˜ yt + δ8[L−1 − 1]at + [1 − L−1]ξc,t














δ8 = 1 +




37B VAR Identiﬁcation and Structural Shocks
As discussed in section 3, we are using one long-run and one short-run restriction to identify
two elements of the vector of shocks εt in (9). In order to estimate the VAR in structural
form, we need a further set of assumptions to just-identify the elements of A0. We follow
Altig et al. (2002) by assuming that the submatrix consisting of columns 2-4 and rows 2-4
of A0 is lower triangular. This assumption is without loss of generality as we do not attach
any structural interpretation to elements 2 through 4 of εt. With these assumptions, we
estimate the ﬁrst equation of the structural VAR imposing the long-run restrictions in the
manner of Shapiro and Watson (1988) by including contemporaneous and lagged variables
of elements 2 through 4 of Yt in ﬁrst-diﬀerenced form. To control for simultaneity, we
estimate the equation by 2SLS, using a constant and Yt−1,...,Yt−4 as ﬁrst-stage regressors
for elements 2 through 4 of Yt. We then sequentially estimate equations 2 through 4 by
IV, using the residuals from the previous regressions as instruments for contemporaneous
variables. Equation 5 can be estimated by OLS by virtue of our short-run identifying
assumption.
We modify this identiﬁcation strategy in one respect. Because, in contrast to Altig et al.,
our VAR includes hours per capita in ﬁrst diﬀerences, we would like to assure that the long-
run response of hours to a technology shock is zero, consistent with the observation that
hours worked have remained broadly unchanged despite the secular trend in real wages.
When this second long-run restriction is not imposed, the IRF of ∆l usually does not
integrate to zero. We therefore reorder our vector of endogenous variables to include ∆l
as the second variable, and apply the Shapiro-Watson method to the ﬁrst two equations.
This leaves the interpretation of the ﬁrst element of εt unchanged, but the second element
is now the only shock that permanently aﬀects hours per capita. Contrary to the ﬁndings
reported by Francis and Ramey (2005), Laubach and Williams (2006) ﬁnd that imposing
this second long-run restriction can have a substantial eﬀect on the response of hours to a
technology shock.
To compute the historical processes of the remaining three structural shocks ξc,t, θp,t,
and θw,t, we invert the model at our parameter estimates to ﬁnd the time series for these
processes that would allow us to exactly replicate the historical data used in estimation. In
fact, this method does not work exactly because the absence of capital in our model implies
that the innovation to technology ǫt is identical to the ﬁrst diﬀerence of log output per hour
38∆(yt − lt), which is close to, but not exactly true in the data. In constructing the shock
processes, we therefore replace the log hours data with detrended log output minus the
cumulative sum of the identiﬁed technology shock. This replacement also means that the
simulated policy rule, which now responds to this model-consistent hours measure, does not
excatly replicate the historical funds rate series, which is consistent with policy responding
to log hours, but the correlation between the two funds rate series is 0.85. The resulting
shock processes are serially correlated, and in the model simulations we approximate them
as AR(1) processes with coeﬃcients 0.41, 0.67, and 0.57 respectively.
C Deriving the Welfare Criterion





Ξc,t (Ct − ηCt−1)
1−σ ￿¯ L − Lu,t
￿ζ(1−σ)
(C∗ − ηC∗)
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We also make use of the quadratic approximations to the labor demand curve (equation 15)

































































































Ξc,t (Ct − ηCt−1)
1−σ ￿¯ L − Lu,t
￿ζ(1−σ)
(C∗ − ηC∗)
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p,∗ · (πp,t − γpπp,t−1)2 + χwΠ2
w,∗ · (πw,t − γwπw,t−1)2
o
.




Ξc,t (Ct − ηCt−1)
1−σ ￿¯ L − Lu,t
￿ζ(1−σ)
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· (πp,t − γpπp,t−1)2 +
Θw,∗
κr,w
· (πw,t − γwπw,t−1)2
)
,
which is the equation given in section 4 of the paper.
D The Model’s Calvo Counterpart
As noted in section 2.3 of the paper we preferred to use the quadratic adjustment cost
approach to modeling sticky-prices and sticky-wages in preference to alternatives that imply
40heterogeneity among agents. Naturally, this raises the question of whether this modelling
choice has serious implications for our results.
In this appendix we present our model’s Calvo counterpart. Clearly the principal diﬀer-
ences are that we no longer have the price and wage adjustment cost terms in equations 2 and
6 (so that these equations become simply Yf,t(j) = Ym,t(j) and Lu,t(i) = Ly,t(i)); instead,
however, the model contains Calvo reset probabilities in the ﬁrms’ proﬁt-maximization
problem and the households’ utility maximization problems. All of the parts of the model—
that is, the ﬁrms’ cost-minimization problem and the process describing monetary policy—
remain the same.

























subject to Yf,t(j)=Ym,t(j) and Yf,t(j)=(Pt(j)/Pt)
−Θp,t Yf,t. (44)









































+Proﬁtst(i) − PtCt(i), for t = 1,···,∞.





All of the equations in the log-linearized model other than the price and wage Phillips curves
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In estimating our model, we could have set:
κc,p =
(1 − αp)(1 − βαp)
αp
and κc,w =
(1 − αw)(1 − βαw)
αw
￿
1 + Θw,∗ ·










































in our estimated model. These would have been identical to equations (27) and (29) which
we did estimate.
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where the “∗” term is only term that diﬀers from what appears in the loss funciton under
our quadratic adjustment costs assumption.
43